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This paper tests various Political Business Cycle theories in a New Keynesian model
with a monetary and ¯scal policy mix. All the policy coe±cients, the target levels of
in°ation and the budget de¯cit, the ¯rms' frequency of price setting, and the standard
deviations of the structural shocks are allowed to depend on `political' regimes: a pre-
election vs. post-election regime, a regime that depends on whether the President (or the
Fed Chairman) is a Democrat or a Republican, and a regime under which the President
and the Fed Chairman share party a±liation in pre-election quarters or not.
The model is estimated using full-information Bayesian methods. The assumption of
rational expectations is relaxed: economic agents can learn about the e®ect of political
variables over time.
The results provide evidence that several coe±cients depend on political variables.
The best-¯tting speci¯cation is one that allows coe±cients to depend on a pre-election vs.
non-election regime. Monetary policy becomes considerably more inertial before elections
and ¯scal policy deviations from a simple rule are more common. The results overall
support the view of an independent Fed that avoids taking policy decisions right before
elections. There is some evidence, however, that policies become more expansionary
before elections, but this evidence seems to disappear in the post-1985 sample. The
estimates also indicate that ¯rms similarly delay their price-setting decisions until after
the upcoming Presidential election.
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laugh.
| Richard Nixon, talking to Arthur Burns on October 23, 1969,
just after Burns' nomination to the Fed had been announced.1
\I'd like to see another lowering of interest rates. I think there's room to do
that. I can understand people worrying about in°ation. But I don't think that's
the big problem now"_
| George H. W. Bush, interview with The New York Times, June
24, 1992.
1 Introduction
Economic conditions before elections a®ect election outcomes.2 Rational politicians who
recognize this regularity may, therefore, be tempted to try to in°uence the economy in the
quarters preceding an election date to maximize their chances of being reelected.
The literature on Political Business Cycles (PBC) has developed models that rationalize
economic °uctuations induced by political cycles. Nordhaus (1975) presented a model of
\opportunistic" political cycles: the party in power stimulates the economy before elections
to improve its reelection probability. Others have realistically argued that di®erent parties
may have di®erent preferences over in°ation and output or unemployment outcomes and,
therefore, we should observe \partisan" political cycles. Hibbs (1977) was the ¯rst to in-
troduce the partisan cycle model, in which left-wing parties were assumed to have at least
one of the following: a higher output target, a higher in°ation target, or a higher relative
weight on minimizing output rather than in°ation deviations from the targets, compared with
right-wing parties. Alesina (1987, 1988) later extended Hibbs' model to introduce rational
expectations.
Several papers test for the existence of opportunistic or partisan cycles in the US. Alesina,
Cohen, and Roubini (1992) and Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) ¯nd only weak evidence
of an opportunistic political cycle looking at M1 growth rates. Grier (1989) and Beck (1987),
instead, ¯nd support for the e®ect of political variables on M1 growth rates for the 1960-
1980 period, but not on the mean level of the federal funds rate. There is basically no
evidence, instead, that political cycles matter for macroeconomic outcomes by looking at
data on unemployment and output growth, and only weak evidence for in°ation.
1Abrams (2006).
2Kramer (1971), Tufte (1975, 1978), Abrams (1980), Abrams and Butkiewitz (1995), Blomberg and Hess
(2003), Fair (1978), and Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal (1993) provide evidence that favorable economic
condition in the quarters prior a presidential election enhance the probability of the incumbent's being re-
elected.
1Empirical tests of the partisan cycle model (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen 1997, Faust
and Irons 1999) ¯nd partisan di®erences in output growth rates, but no support for partisan
cycles in in°ation and monetary policy.
Tests of PBC cycles typically assume monetary policy as the main tool that is exploited
by politicians to manipulate the economy. These studies usually focus on comparing the level
of in°ation, output, money growth rates or interest rates across political cycles or they add
a political dummy variable to the relevant regression and test its signi¯cance.
This paper takes a di®erent approach. The paper aims to empirically test various political
business cycle theories adopting an optimizing New Keynesian model with a monetary and
¯scal policy mix as the main setting. The New Keynesian model is a baseline setting that
is widely used in the analysis of monetary policy. The inclusion of both ¯scal and monetary
policy is motivated by Drazen (2000b).3
The monetary and ¯scal policy rule parameters, as well as parameters that re°ect the
frequency of price adjustment by ¯rms and the steady-state level of in°ation, are allowed to
depend on the (observed) political regime.
Several hypotheses may thus be tested. The coe±cients may, in fact, di®er in pre-election
versus no-election periods, they may depend on the Party a±liation of either the President
or the Federal Reserve Chairman, and on whether the President and the Fed Chairman share
the same a±liation or not in a pre-election period (the di®erent cases are introduced one at
a time in the model to save degrees of freedom).
Political cycles in monetary and ¯scal policy are tested by looking at the various policy
feedback coe±cients rather than at the mean levels of outcome variables or money growth
rates as typically done in the literature. The paper is, therefore, more closely related to the
recent study by Abrams and Iossifov (2006), who use a Taylor rule during the 1957-2004
sample to test political cycle theories. They use, however, a single equation approach, while
this paper employs a full-information Bayesian approach to estimate a general equilibrium
model with both monetary and ¯scal policy. The paper is also related to Faust and Irons
(1999), who estimate an identi¯ed VAR in which the coe±cients are contingent on the regime.
The current paper, instead, uses a structural model to judge the importance of political
3Drazen (2000b) reviews the evidence accumulated in 25 years of political business cycle research and
concludes that models based on monetary policy are not entirely convincing; he argues that a larger focus
on ¯scal policy, often disregarded in the literature, may prove more promising. There is evidence, in fact,
that ¯scal transfers are manipulated to gain an electoral advantage (Tufte 1978, Keech and Pak 1989, and
Alesina 1988). Moreover, the use of monetary policy as the main driving force may be problematic. Politicians
typically do not have full control of monetary policy, since this task is left to independent central banks.
2regimes. The structural model is considerably more parsimonious than Faust and Irons'
VAR and allows for an easier interpretation of the coe±cients.
If political cycles were important, agents should be able to incorporate this information
into their expectations. Under the conventional assumption of rational expectations, however,
agents would be assumed to know that political cycles exist and to have known this for the
whole sample period. Besides, they would also have perfect knowledge about the `size' of the
political cycle e®ect and, under partisan cycles, about the di®erent political parties' objective
functions.
These are, of course, strong informational assumptions. Here I relax rational expectations,
by assuming that economic subjects have to learn about economic relationships over time.
Economic agents form near-rational expectations. They use a model of the economy that
resembles the `Minimum State Variable' solution under rational expectations, but they do
not know the model parameters. Therefore, they use historical data to learn the relevant
model coe±cients over time. They use their perceived model and the updated parameter
estimates to form expectations of future macroeconomic conditions, which they need to solve
their optimal consumption and price-setting decisions. Agents in the model, therefore, are
assumed to have the same knowledge an econometrician would have in real-time, in the spirit
of the adaptive learning literature (e.g. Evans and Honkapohja 2001 for an overview). In this
speci¯cation, the agents are allowed to learn from past observations how political business
cycles a®ect °uctuations in output, in°ation, and future policies. From a more empirical point
of view, learning introduces time variation in the model, which helps ¯tting macroeconomic
data, again in a very parsimonious way.4
The model is estimated using likelihood-based Bayesian methods on post-war U.S. data.
The estimation approach follows Milani (2007), who shows how to estimate a Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with near-rational expectations and learning.
The Bayesian approach facilitates the joint estimation of the learning parameters together
with the `deep' parameters of the economy and the policy feedback parameters. In this way,
the learning process is jointly extrapolated from the data, rather than imposed a priori and
the analysis conditioned on it. The relevance of di®erent political business cycles' theories
can then be gauged by looking at how the parameters' posterior distributions vary across
regimes and by comparing the marginal likelihoods of the alternative model speci¯cations.
4By changing only one parameter, the constant gain coe±cient, very di®erent learning processes may be
obtained.
3Results. The results are supportive of the notion that political variables matter. Sev-
eral policy parameters, as well as some of the economy's structural parameters, vary across
political regimes. The best-¯tting speci¯cation is one in which the relevant political regime
is de¯ned by whether the economy is in the few quarters preceding a Presidential election or
not.
The results show that monetary policy becomes extremely inertial before the election.
The rarity of policy changes is consistent with an independent Fed, which is also concerned
about giving an impression of not actively participating in the political race. Apart from the
inertia, there is some evidence, although not strong, that both monetary policy (before 1979)
and ¯scal policy become more expansionary before elections.
This paper mainly aims to add to the empirical literature on PBCs. But the paper
can also be seen as a contribution to empirical studies of the New Keynesian model, aimed
at testing whether the exclusion of political variables may have represented an important
misspeci¯cation of the model. The paper is ¯nally related to the literature that studies the
monetary-¯scal policy mix (e.g. Favero and Monacelli 2005, Muscatelli, Tirelli, and Trecroci
2004) and to empirical applications of models with adaptive learning (e.g. Adam 2005, Milani
2007, Orphanides and Williams 2005).
2 The Model
I assume that the aggregate dynamics of the economy can be summarized by the following
New Keynesian model, which is widely used to study monetary policy issues and which can be
derived from the optimizing decisions of economic agents (see Woodford 2003 for a standard
derivation):
xt = b Etxt+1 ¡ ¾(it ¡ b Et¼t+1 ¡ rN
t ) (1)
¼t ¡ ¼¤(St) = ¯ b Et(¼t+1 ¡ ¼¤(St)) + ·(St)xt + ut (2)
it = ½MP(St)it¡1 + (1 ¡ ½MP(St))[rN
t +
+¼¤(St) + Â¼(St)(¼t¡1 ¡ ¼¤(St)) + Âx(St)xt¡1] + "t (3)
dt = ½FP(St)dt¡1 + (1 ¡ ½FP)(St)[¿0(St) + ¿B(St)Bt¡1 + ¿x(St)xt¡1] + ´t (4)
where xt denotes the output gap (the deviation of real from potential GDP), ¼t denotes
in°ation, it is the nominal interest rate, dt denotes the budget de¯cit, Bt = ¯¡1(Bt¡1 ¡
4¼t¡1 +(1¡¯)dt¡1)+it¡1 is the debt to GDP ratio, rN
t denotes the natural rate of interest,5
ut is a cost-push supply shock, and "t and ´t are monetary and ¯scal policy shocks. rN
t and ut
are assumed to follow AR(1) processes rN
t = ½rrN
t¡1 + ¾r(St)ºr
t and ut = ½uut¡1 + ¾u(St)ºu
t ,
while "t and ´t are i.i.d. with mean 0 and variances ¾"(St) and ¾´(St). St denotes the
`political' regime, which will be de¯ned in more detail in section 2.2.
Equation (1) represents the log-linearized intertemporal Euler equation that derives from
the households' optimal choice of consumption. The output gap depends on the expected one-
period ahead output gap and on the ex-ante real interest rate. The coe±cient ¾ > 0 represents
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. Equation (2) is the forward-
looking New Keynesian Phillips curve that can be derived from the optimizing behavior of
monopolistically-competitive ¯rms under Calvo price setting (assuming, instead, quadratic
adjustment costs in nominal prices would lead to the same law of motion). In°ation depends
on expected in°ation in t+1 and on current output gap. The parameter 0 < ¯ < 1 represents
the households' discount factor, ¼¤ denotes the steady-state level of in°ation, which is also
the in°ation target adopted by the central bank, and · denotes the slope of the Phillips curve.
Equation (3) describes monetary policy. The central bank follows a Taylor rule by adjusting
its policy instrument, a short-term nominal interest rate, in response to deviations of in°ation
and output gap from their targets (equal to ¼¤ for in°ation and 0 for the output gap). Â¼
and Âx are the policy feedback coe±cients and ½MP accounts for interest-rate inertia.
This setting incorporates two extensions of the baseline 3-equations New Keynesian model.
First, the model includes a ¯scal policy rule, along with the usual Taylor rule that describes
monetary policy.6 A ¯scal policy rule is included in light of Drazen (2000b)'s argument that
¯scal policy may be more relevant than monetary policy in revealing the e®ects of politics on
macroeconomic decisions. The ¯scal policy rule (4) implies a reaction of the budget de¯cit
to the output gap and to current debt (debt to GDP ratio); ¿x and ¿B are the feedback
coe±cients (Taylor 2000 and Favero and Monacelli 2005 analyze similar rules and show that
they can accurately describe the behavior of post-war U.S. ¯scal policy).7
Second, the paper relaxes the strong informational assumption that requires agents to
5In this model r
N
t is typically a®ected by changes in potential output as well as shocks to government
spending. Fiscal policy, therefore, a®ects demand in the model only through changes in r
N
t .
6Typical studies of monetary policy in a New Keynesian framework often ignore ¯scal policy, by assuming
that the ¯scal authority operates to maintain a zero-balance budget at all times. The details of ¯scal policy
usually do not a®ect the dynamics of the economy in such a model and are, therefore, ignored. Here, ¯scal
policy is, instead, included to test its dependence on political variables.
7The reaction to the output gap aims to account for the cyclical components of ¯scal policy and can contain
the e®ect due to the operation of automatic stabilizers.
5form fully-rational expectations. I assume what is usually considered as a `small' deviation
from rationality: agents use the endogenous variables that appear in the model's solution
under rational expectations in their perceived model of the economy. But they are assumed
to lack knowledge about the structural parameters.8 Therefore, they use historical data to
estimate the model and learn the values of the relevant parameters over time. b Et, therefore,
indicates subjective (near-rational) expectations and may di®er from Et the usual expectation
operator.
In the model, several coe±cients are assumed to depend on the political regime.9 First,
to test for the existence of political business cycles induced by policy, the monetary and
¯scal policy coe±cients are allowed to di®er across political regimes. This di®ers from many
previous PBC studies, which test the existence of cycles by comparing mean in°ation, output,
or money growth rates across regimes. Here, instead, I test whether the feedback coe±cients
to in°ation and output, and, consequently, the relative importance of the two objectives,
depend on political variables. Besides, I also allow the steady states of in°ation and of the
budget balance, which can be interpreted as the target levels that policymakers try to achieve,
to be regime-dependent.
If opportunistic cycles are important, we might expect to observe, for example, an atten-
uated monetary policy reaction to deviations of in°ation from target, possibly along with a
higher in°ation target and a higher budget de¯cit, while if partisan cycles matter we would
probably observe a higher reaction coe±cient to output than to in°ation under Democratic
Presidents (and again higher in°ation and budget de¯cit targets). If, instead, the Fed is
not politically-motivated, but, as some observers argue, simply wants to avoid taking any
action as elections approach, the policy rule would still be characterized by lower reaction
coe±cients in pre-election quarters and maybe by more inertia.
The \deep" parameters of the economy should not, in principle, vary across regimes: ¯
is typically ¯xed in the literature and ¾ will be estimated at a common value across regimes.
It may be argued that ·, instead, which represents the slope of the Phillips curve and which
is a negative function of the Calvo pricing parameter (the probability of resetting a price
in any given period) may not be really interpreted as `structural'. The likelihood of ¯rms'
8As explained for example in Preston (2005) and Milani (2006), although they may be assumed to know
their own preference parameters, they cannot infer the aggregate law of motions because they neither know
other agents' preferences nor the value of aggregate parameters, such as Calvo's price stickiness coe±cient.
9Here the regimes are assumed to be observed; therefore, the estimation of the model basically reduces to
an estimation with an added dummy variable (St). Faust and Irons (1999) assume a similar regime-contingent
structure in their VAR model.
6changing prices, in fact, may depend on the speci¯c policy environment and, in particular, on
the prevailing in°ation rate. Therefore, I let the data decide whether · varies across regimes
or not. Finally, the di®erent macroeconomic outcomes may be due to various degrees of luck
rather than di®erent policies: to account for this, the standard deviations of the supply and
demand shocks, as well as the standard deviations of monetary and ¯scal policy surprises are
allowed to vary across regimes.10
By relaxing the standard assumptions that are usually imposed under rational expec-
tations, economic agents are not endowed with the information that the parameters of the
economy depend on political variables and they do not know their exact values. They are,
however, allowed to learn from actual data the nature of economic relationships and the
extent to which political regimes matter.
2.1 Expectations Formation and Learning by Economic Agents
As made clear by (1) and (2), economic agents need to form expectations of future macroe-
conomic variables. To form such expectations, I follow the adaptive learning literature (e.g.
Evans and Honkapohja 2001) in assuming that they use a linear model of the economy, which
represents their Perceived Law of Motion (PLM):
Zt = at + btZt¡1 + ctBt¡1 + dtSt + et (5)
where Zt ´ [xt;¼t;it;dt]0.11 Agents do not know the relevant model parameters. They use
historical data to learn those parameters over time. As additional data become available in
subsequent periods, they update their estimates of the coe±cients (at;bt;ct;dt) according to
the constant-gain learning formula
b Át = b Át¡1 + gR¡1
t Xt(Zt ¡ X0
tb Át¡1) (6)
Rt = Rt¡1 + g(Xt¡1X0
t¡1 ¡ Rt¡1) (7)
where (6) describes the updating of the learning rule coe±cients b Át = (a0
t;vec(bt;ct;dt)0)
0,
and (7) describes the updating of the precision matrix Rt of the stacked regressors Xt ´
10For monetary and ¯scal policy disturbances, di®erent standard deviations across regimes would also signal
that deviations from the rules, i.e. unsystematic policy or policy surprises, are more common under one
particular regime.
11The PLM includes the lagged values of the endogenous variables as does the Minimum State Variable
solution of the system under rational expectations. Agents are, therefore, estimating a VAR(1) in the endoge-
nous variables and they are assumed not to be able to observe the current value of the shocks r
N
t and ut,
which would also appear in the RE solution. Not including the shocks in the VAR does not signi¯cantly a®ect
the results and it appears as a more realistic description of the information set of economic agents.
7f1;xt¡1;¼t¡1;it¡1;dt¡1;Bt¡1;Stg
t¡1
0 . Therefore, agents' beliefs in b Át are equal to their pre-
vious period values plus an update that is based on period-t's forecast error. g denotes
the constant gain coe±cient,12 which captures how quickly agents revise their beliefs due to
incoming information.
2.2 Political Regimes
The di®erent regimes I consider are:
1. a pre-election versus post-election regime. Here St equals 1 in the 7 quarters before
an election and 0 otherwise. Allowing the model parameters to depend on the regime
allows me to test the role of opportunistic cycles in both monetary and ¯scal policy.
2. Republican versus Democratic President. St equals 1 if the President is a Democrat
and 0 if Republican. I can, therefore, estimate the importance of partisan cycles in
monetary and ¯scal policy.13
3. Republican versus Democratic Federal Reserve Chairman: St equals 1 if the Chairman
is a Democrat and 0 if Republican.14 This division may be more relevant than (2) to
test for the existence of partisan cycles in monetary policy.
4. A pre-election regime when the President and the Fed Chairman share party a±liation
versus a di®erent party or post-election regime. St equals 1 when the President and
the Chairman are both Democrats or both Republicans and we are in the 7 quar-
ters preceding a presidential election. These regimes may provide a better test of the
opportunistic cycles hypothesis, particularly in monetary policy.15
Using (5) and the updated estimates in (6), economic agents can form expectations as
b Et¡1Zt+1 = at¡1(I + bt¡1) + b2
t¡1Zt¡1 + (I + bt¡1)ct¡1Bt¡1 + dt¡1 b Et¡1St+1; (8)
12Constant-gain learning has been used in Sargent (1999), Orphanides and Williams (2005), Primiceri
(2006), and Milani (2007) among others.
13Fiscal policy may also depend on the Congress majority, not simply on the President. I leave the test of
the e®ects of Congress to future work.
14The partisanship of a Chairman is measured by looking at the Party of the President who ¯rst nominated
him. Greenspan, for example, who was ¯rst nominated by a Republican President and then renominated
by Clinton, a Democrat, is counted as Republican for the whole term. Whether other FOMC members are
Republicans or Democrats may also matter, but this complication is not considered here under the assumption
that the Chairman plays a dominant role in decisions and that occasions in which the Chairman is put in
minority during FOMC votes are extremely rare (this is documented in Chappell et al. 2005).
15Abrams and Iossifov (2006) ¯nd that this is the only political cycle hypothesis that is signi¯cant in their
Taylor rules regressions.
8where I denotes the identity matrix. I assume that economic agents can observe only macroe-
conomic variables up to t¡1 when forming their expectations for t+1. In forming expectations
about future output and in°ation, they also need to forecast the future regime ( b Et¡1St+1).
When the regime is only a pre-election or post-election regime this is always trivial, since
election dates are known in advance and, therefore b Et¡1St+1 = St+1. When the regimes, in-
stead, depend on the winning party, the agents are assumed to forecast St+1 in the following
way: (
b Et¡1St+1 = St+1 if qt 6= 0
b Et¡1St+1 = ©(St;xt¡1;xt¡2;xt¡3;xt¡4) if qt = 0
(9)
where qt 2 f0;:::;15g denotes the number of quarters that have passed since the Presidential
election date (a similar structure was assumed in Faust and Irons 1999). Therefore, when
there is no upcoming election, St+1 is perfectly known. Every 16 quarters, however, economic
subjects need to forecast the outcome of elections. They do it using estimates from a Probit
model with past output gaps as regressors.16 In this way, they can forecast the probability
that the incumbent will win the elections given the past relation between election outcomes
and macroeconomic conditions.
Therefore, the formation of expectations, as characterized in (8), may di®er according to
the political cycle. Agents may learn from experience whether political variables matter or
not.
3 Bayesian Estimation
I estimate the model by likelihood-based Bayesian methods.17 The Bayesian approach fa-
cilitates the estimation of the learning parameters jointly with the structural parameters of
the economy. In particular, here I estimate the constant gain coe±cient jointly with the
parameters describing preferences and the monetary and ¯scal policy rule parameters.18
16They are able to forecast the correct winner in 7 out of the 9 elections in the sample. It may be more
realistic to allow agents to learn also about the Probit coe±cients. Because of the small number of elections
in the sample, however, I assume that they know the values of the full-sample Probit estimates, rather than
letting them update the estimates over time. Notice that agents need only to forecast future election winners;
they are assumed, instead, to be able to perfectly predict the party a±liation of the future Fed Chairman,
since this has always coincided in the sample with the a±liation of the President who has to decide the ¯rst
nomination.
17See An and Schorfheide (2007) for a review of the Bayesian estimation of DSGE models under rational
expectations.
18The estimation strategy follows Milani (2007). Estimating also the constant gain coe±cient is crucial,
since the results are sometimes dependent on the chosen gain. For instance, Milani (2004) shows how the
estimates of the backward-looking term in in°ation vary over the possible gain values.
9Milani (2007) shows that learning improves the empirical ¯t of a similar New Keynesian
model compared with the rational expectations case and it allows researchers to avoid in-
cluding some of the so-called \mechanical" sources of persistence that are needed to make
the model match the sluggishness of macroeconomic variables.
I use quarterly U.S. data on in°ation, output gap, the federal funds rate, the budget
balance, and the debt to GDP ratio. In°ation is calculated as the log change in the GDP
Implicit Price De°ator converted at annual rates, and the output gap as the log deviation
of Real GDP from Potential GDP (using the series computed by the Congressional Budget
O±ce). The federal funds rate represents the monetary policy instrument, while the ¯scal
policy instrument is assumed to be the budget de¯cit, which is computed as Federal govern-
ment current expenditures minus interest payments and minus Federal government current
receipts as a fraction of GDP. Bt in the model is given by the debt to GDP ratio. The data
are shown in Figure 1.19
The model coe±cients are collected in the vector µ:
µ(St) = f¾;¼¤(St);·(St);½MP(St);Â¼(St);Âx(St);½FP(St);¿0(St);¿B(St);¿x(St);Q(St);gg
(10)
where Q(St) groups the regime-dependent standard deviations of the supply, demand, and
policy shocks. The parameters depend on the political regime:
µ(St) = µ0(1 ¡ St) + µ1(St); (11)
where St corresponds to one of the regimes discussed in the previous section.
The learning process in expressions (6) and (7) needs to be initialized. The initial beliefs b Á0
and R0 are derived from estimating the PLM (eq. 5) on pre-sample data (using observations
from 1954:III to 1965:IV).
The model is then estimated using data from 1966:I to 2006:IV.20 The likelihood is com-
puted for the four endogenous variables: in°ation, output gap, federal funds rate, and budget
de¯cit.
I use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate draws from the posterior distribution.
At each iteration, the likelihood is evaluated using the Kalman ¯lter. I consider 300,000 draws,
19All data series were downloaded from FRED, the economic database of the Federal Reserve of St. Louis,
and are demeaned prior to the estimation.
20Data on debt are available from this date. The choice of 1966 as starting date is, however, sensible since
it is often argued that the federal funds rate may be realistically considered the main instrument of monetary
policy starting from around this date.
10discarding an initial burn-in of 75,000 draws.21
Table 1 describes the priors. I ¯x ¯ equal to 0:99.22 I assume a Gamma distribution with
mean 1 for ¾. The slope coe±cient of the Phillips curve, ·, follows a Normal distribution
with mean :2 and standard deviation :1. The monetary policy rule coe±cients also follow
Normal distributions with mean 1:5 and standard deviation :25 for the in°ation feedback
coe±cients, and mean :5 and standard deviation :25 for the output feedback coe±cients.
I choose inverse gamma distributions for the standard deviations of the shocks and Beta
distributions for the autoregressive coe±cients. Finally, the constant gain coe±cient follows
a Gamma distribution with prior mean :031 and prior standard deviation :022.
I will emphasize in describing the results the cases in which the likelihood seems °at for
some of the parameters and those for which the priors appear to have a strong in°uence on
the shape of the posterior.23
4 Results
4.1 Opportunistic Cycles in Fiscal and Monetary Policies
I start by testing for the existence of opportunistic cycles. These can manifest themselves
as an overstimulation of the economy during the quarters preceding an election. Monetary
policymakers, for example, may be overly accommodative or they may simply attenuate their
usual responses to output and in°ation, by delaying any decisions until after the election.
Table 2 reports the estimation results, while Figure 2 compares the posterior distributions
for the estimated parameters across regimes.
The monetary policy coe±cients seem to depend on the political regime. During pre-
election quarters, the posterior distribution of the interest-rate smoothing coe±cient ½MP
clearly shifts to the right (the estimated posterior mean switches from 0.877 to 0.97). This
indicates that policy changes are rare before elections. The monetary policymaker prefers
to keep rates ¯xed and to delay decisions until elections are over. This result supports the
notion of an independent Fed that tries not to a®ect the political race and that wants to
avoid being perceived as partisan. Some evidence, albeit moderate, of opportunistic cycles
21To monitor convergence, I perform a number of checks, which are described in the appendix.
22The parameter ¯ is pinned out by the steady-state relation ¯ = (1+r)
¡1, where r is the steady-state real
interest rate.
23Under the Bayesian approach, the potential non-identi¯cation of some of the parameters does not pose
particular di±culties in the estimation (e.g. Poirier 1998). I will therefore estimate all the parameters and let
the data speak about their identi¯cation.
11appears by looking at the other monetary policy coe±cients: the reaction to in°ation declines
before elections (the posterior mean goes from 1.479 to 1.335), while the in°ation target and
the reaction to output become higher (the mean target increases from 2.54 to 3.16, the gap
coe±cient from 0.35 to 0.54).
Fiscal policy is likewise more inertial before elections (the posterior mean for ½FP is 0.89
in pre-election quarters, 0.84 otherwise). The target de¯cit is also higher before elections, and
the de¯cit becomes more responsive to the output gap (the de¯cit increases more when the
output gap increases). The ¯scal policy feedback coe±cient to the output gap ¿x may contain
two e®ects: mainly, the e®ect of automatic stabilizers, but also a component that reveals
discretionary ¯scal policy. Since the posterior distributions slightly di®er across regimes,
it might indicate that the discretionary component becomes slightly more important right
before elections.24
The standard deviations of both monetary and ¯scal policy surprises are strongly a®ected
by the proximity of an election: ¯scal policy deviations from the rule are considerably more
common and sizeable before elections (the posterior distribution shifts to the right), while
monetary policy deviations are less so (since, as seen, monetary policy decisions are unlikely
in this regime).
Finally, another parameter that is crucially a®ected by the proximity to an election is ·,
which denotes the slope of the Phillips curve and is an inverse function of the degree of price
rigidity in the economy. The distribution of · tilts toward 0 when St = 1, signaling that ¯rms
tend to have higher probability to keep prices ¯xed in the quarters before elections. From
the estimated ·, we can derive the implied Calvo parameter ®, such that (1¡®) denotes the
probability of ¯rms' changing prices in a given quarter (or equivalently, the fraction of ¯rms
that change prices in a given quarter). (1 ¡ ®) goes from 0.28 in after-elections quarters to
0.17 right before elections.25 Therefore, ¯rms prefer to delay the price-setting decision until
the electoral uncertainty is resolved.26
24Taylor (2000) ¯nds that the feedback to the output gap is mainly due to automatic stabilizers, while
discretionary actions have been small and not consistent over time.




1+!µ , where ® is the
Calvo parameter, ! the elasticity of marginal costs to changes in income, ¾ is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and µ is the elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated goods. The calibration
to calculate the implied ® here assumes standard values: ! = 0:8, ¾ = 1, and µ = 7.
26Gar¯nkel and Glazer (1994) looked at the distribution of wage contracts in election and non-election years
and found that union and ¯rms prefer to negotiate in the quarters immediately after the election rather than
those immediately before. This paper's results similarly suggest that ¯rms rationally choose to postpone their
decision until after the election outcome is known.
124.2 Partisan Cycles in Fiscal and Monetary Policies
Economic parameters and policies may systematically di®er depending on whether a Repub-
lican or Democratic President is in the White House. Table 3 and Figure 3 provide evidence
on this hypothesis. Again the monetary and ¯scal policy parameters substantially di®er
across political regimes, although in a counterintuitive way. Monetary policy is more inertial
during Republican terms; the feedback coe±cient to in°ation is higher and the feedback to
the output gap lower under Democrats than under Republicans.27 This is the opposite of
what is usually theorized by PBC studies. The posterior distributions of monetary policy
parameters during Republican presidencies are also such that a nontrivial probability mass
refers to policies that do not respect the Taylor principle.28 Fiscal policy also displays a
higher target for the budget de¯cit and a lower reaction to changes in the output gap under
Republican Presidents than under Democrats (¯scal policy with Democratic Presidents is
considerably inertial, instead).29
Turning to other parameters, the demand and supply shocks that have hit the economy
had higher standard deviation during Democratic terms.
4.3 Partisan Cycles using Fed Chairman's A±liation
Since the Federal Reserve has full independence in setting monetary policy, the party's af-
¯liation or sympathy of the Fed Chairman could be, in principle, more relevant than the
President's party to test for partisan di®erences in monetary policy.
The estimation results, however, mirror those in the previous section. Fed Chairmen
that were appointed by Democratic Presidents have on average reacted more aggressively
toward in°ation and cared less about output °uctuations compared with those appointed
by Republican Presidents. It should be emphasized, however, that only few changes in the
relevant political variable are available in the sample and, therefore, the results are likely to
depend a lot on Arthur Burns' passive monetary policy (which is counted as Republican)
and Paul Volcker's aggressive policy during the disin°ation (which a®ects the results for
Democrats).
27The data do not appear very informative, in this case, about the value of the in°ation target: the posterior
distributions are very close to the priors.
28The Taylor principle in this model is given by the following condition (Woodford 2003): Â¼+(
1¡¯
· )Âx > 1:
29The results could, of course, depend on the smaller variation in the regime variable when partisan cycles,
rather than opportunistic cycles, are analyzed. Therefore, episodes such as Volcker's ¯ght against in°ation
(during Carter's term) and Burns' accommodating monetary policy in the Nixon years can signi¯cantly a®ect
the monetary policy results, as, in the same way, the budget surplus during Clinton's presidency along with
the de¯cits during Bush and Reagan's presidencies may greatly in°uence the ¯scal policy conclusions.
134.4 Opportunistic Cycles in Monetary Policy when the President and the
Fed Chairman Share Party A±liation
It may be realistic to argue that opportunistic cycles are present only when the Fed Chairman
shares political party with the President. Abrams and Iossifov (2006), in fact, ¯nd that this
is the only case in which political cycles matter in their estimated Taylor rules. Along the
same lines, Chappell, McGregor, and Vermilyea (2005), analyzing FOMC voting records,
show that FOMC members are more likely to support a pre-election expansionary monetary
policy when they were appointed by a president of the incumbent party.
The evidence, presented in Table 5 and Figure 5, is similar to that on opportunistic cycles.
Monetary policy is especially inertial before elections even when the President and the Fed
Chairman have similar political sympathies. There is evidence of a lower reaction toward
in°ation, a higher in°ation target, and a larger reaction to changes in the output gap before
elections.
4.5 Beliefs
Economic agents were allowed to update their beliefs over time. Figure 6 shows two selected
parameters that appear to have considerably changed over the sample. One is the perceived
sensitivity of the output gap to changes in the interest rate. Agents' beliefs evolve over
the sample to re°ect the perception of declining sensitivity. The second is the autoregressive
coe±cient in the perceived law of motion for in°ation, which indicates changes in the perceived
persistence of this variable. The estimated coe±cient starts at values close to 0, but it
considerably increases from the late 1960s to the early 1970s and later in the 1980s, to
decline again to low values at the end of the sample. Adding learning to the model admits
this important time variation in beliefs, which would be ruled out under rational expectations.
Figure 7, instead, shows the evolving agents' beliefs about the importance of the di®erent
political variables. For example, looking at the ¯rst row in the graph, it can be seen that
agents adjust their beliefs in the 1970s as they are learning that policy rates are lower and
the budget de¯cit higher before elections. During Carter's term, though, these beliefs are
quickly revised. In a way that is consistent with the model estimates, agents perceive more
contractionary monetary and ¯scal policies during Democratic terms.
144.6 Model Comparison
The paper has reported estimates for several models and shown which political variables
seem to matter for policy decisions and macroeconomic outcomes. But which of the models
estimated so far provides the best ¯t of the data?
To evaluate the ¯t of the models, I compare their marginal likelihoods using Geweke's
modi¯ed harmonic mean approximation (Table 6).30 The marginal likelihoods favor the op-
portunistic cycles model. The opportunistic cycle when the President and the Fed Chairman
come from the same party ranks second. Of course partisan cycles may also be present { I
simply ¯nd that, as a single explanation, they ¯t less well than opportunistic cycles { but the
limited data do not allow including more than one regime at a time in the model. Partisan
cycles may also su®er from a lower variability of the regime over the sample.
4.7 What Would Have Monetary and Fiscal Policy Been in the Absence
of Political E®ects?
Under opportunistic cycles, which is the case that is most supported by the data, the mone-
tary and ¯scal policy rules di®er in pre- versus post-election quarters. But how large are the
di®erences in practice?
Figure 8 displays the deviations in the monetary and ¯scal policy instruments that are
found by comparing the implied Federal Funds rate and budget de¯cit obtained by using
the same policy rules that are estimated for non-election quarters for the whole sample,
with those implied by rules that di®er, as estimated, in pre-election quarters. The graph
shows that monetary policy has typically been more expansionary before elections in the
pre-1979 sample, but after Volcker, the increased inertia seems to have led the central bank
to be, instead, more contractionary, except in the later part of the sample. Fiscal policy has
been consistently more expansionary before elections, with the main exception being during
Clinton years.
4.8 Post-1985 Sample
Tempelman (2007) has argued that the positive evidence of political cycles in US monetary
policy found by Abrams and Yossifov (2006) may be due to their use of a long sample.
The e®ect may not have been stable over such a sample and if tested only over the second
30The marginal likelihood as a measure of ¯t automatically penalizes models for an excessive number of
parameters.
15half, there would be no evidence of political cycles. I test this argument by repeating the
estimation on data starting from 1985:I.
Monetary policy is still considerably more inertial before elections, and so is ¯scal policy
(Figure 9). There is no evidence that monetary policy cares di®erently about in°ation in the
proximity of elections: the in°ation target and in°ation feedback coe±cient are characterized
by posterior distributions that substantially overlap.31 For monetary policy, however, some
evidence exists that the reaction to the output gap is higher before elections. There isn't
much evidence of an opportunistic cycle in ¯scal policy: ¿b is now positive (and slightly larger
near elections), but the target de¯cit is lower when St = 1.32
5 Conclusions
This paper has tested whether the coe±cients of a baseline New Keynesian model depend
on political variables. The paper has provided empirical evidence on PBC theories, testing
di®erent versions of both opportunistic and partisan cycle models.
The results provide support for the existence of changes in the economic structure and
policies that are due to political variables. The best-¯tting model is one which allows pol-
icy and structural parameters to depend on whether the economy is or not in pre-election
quarters, as in opportunistic cycles' models. The results, however, are not entirely consistent
with opportunistic cycles as they are usually interpreted.
The major di®erence in pre-election quarters is that monetary policy becomes consider-
ably more inertial: the Fed seems to delay changes in policy until after the election. This
is consistent with the view of an independent Fed, which does not want to be seen as an
active player in the Presidential race. Some evidence, however, exists that both monetary
and ¯scal policies are more somewhat less concerned about in°ation and more about output
before elections.
As a future avenue for research, it may be worthwhile testing for electoral e®ects in ¯scal
policy at a lower level of aggregation. In this paper, the ¯scal policy instrument has been
considered to be the budget de¯cit. But future work may fruitfully test whether political
variables matter more for government spending or for average tax rates, and, regarding
spending, for which categories of government spending in particular. Likewise, future research
31The exact estimates somewhat depend on the exact starting date of the sample, but the main conclusions
remain.
32Due to the small sample, this may be largely a®ected by Clinton surplus in the quarters before the 2000
election.
16should investigate whether the change in policies before elections displays asymmetries across
recessions and expansions.
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19A Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm















Y T j µ
¢
is the likelihood function, p(µ) the prior for the parameters, and Y T =
[y1;:::;yT]
0 collects the data histories.
To generate draws from the posterior distribution p
¡
µ j Y T¢
, I use the Metropolis algo-
rithm. The procedure works as follows.
1. Start from an arbitrary value for the parameter vector µ0. Set j = 1.
2. Evaluate p
¡




j = µj¡1 + ", where µ¤
j is the proposal draw and " » N(0;c§"). c is a scale
factor that is usually adjusted to keep the acceptance ratio of the MH algorithm at an
optimal rate (25%-50%, see Geweke 1999). The acceptance rates in the estimation are
all between 35 and 40%.























6. Repeat for j + 1 from 2: until j = D (D = total number of draws).
A.1 Convergence
To assess convergence of the MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) simulation, I performed
various checks, besides looking at the trace plots of the draws. I have considered the con-
vergence tests proposed by Geweke (1992), and Raftery and Lewis (1995). Raftery and
Lewis (1995)'s diagnostics suggests a minimum number of total draws, a thinning parame-
ter, and a minimum burn-in, by computing the autocorrelation of the draws. Geweke's test
instead compares the partial means b ¹1 = 1
D1
PD1
j=1 g (µj) and b ¹2 = 1
D2
PD2
j=D1+1 g (µj), ob-
tained from the ¯rst D1 and last D2 simulation draws. The null hypothesis of equal means
between the two samples of draws can be tested knowing that, for D ! 1, the quantity









=) N(0;1). I also look at the plots derived from the test
proposed by Yu and Mykland (1994), based on CUMSUM plots of the draws.33 Finally,
I ascertain convergence by looking at the recursive mean plots and bivariate scatter plots
among the parameters to evaluate the mixing of the chain.







=¾µ, where ¹µ and ¾µ are the empirical mean and
standard deviations of the D draws of the Markov Chain. The plot of CSt converges to 0 as t increases.
20Prior Distribution
Description Parameter Distr. Support Prior Mean 95% Prior Prob. Interval
Inverse IES ¾¡1 ¡ R+ 1 [0.12-2.78]
Discount Factor ¯ - - 0.99 -
Slope Phillips Curve ·(St) ¡ R+ 0.25 [0.03-0.69]
In°ation Target ¼¤(St) N R 3 [1.04-4.96]
MP Inertia ½MP(St) B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459-0.985]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼(St) N R 1.5 [1.01-1.99]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx(St) N R 0.5 [0.01-0.99]
FP Inertia ½FP(St) B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459-0.985]
Budget De¯cit Target ¿0(St) N R 0 [-2.66-1.26]
FP Debt feedback ¿B(St) N R 0 [-0.49-0.49]
FP Output Gap feedback ¿x(St) N R -0.5 [-0.99/-0.01]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r(St) ¡¡1 R+ 1 [0.34-2.76]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u(St) ¡¡1 R+ 1 [0.34-2.76]
Std. MP Shock ¾"(St) ¡¡1 R+ 1 [0.34-2.76]
Std. FP Shock ¾´(St) ¡¡1 R+ 1 [0.34-2.76]
Autoregr. coe®. rN
t ½r B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459-0.985]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u B [0,1] 0.8 [0.459-0.985]
Constant Gain g ¡ R+ 0.031 [0.003-0.087]
Table 1 - Prior Distributions.
(U= Uniform, N= Normal, ¡= Gamma, B= Beta, ¡¡1= Inverse Gamma)
21Pre vs. Post-ELECTION Posterior Distribution
St = 0 St = 1
Description Parameter Mean 95% PPI Mean 95% PPI
Inverse IES ¾¡1 8.33 [5.88-11.47] 8.33 [5.88-11.47]
Discount Factor ¯ 0.99 - 0.99 -
Slope PC ·(St) 0.108 [0.03-0.20] 0.036 [0.004-0.09]
In°ation Target ¼¤(St) 2.54 [0.62-4.42] 3.16 [1.21-5.16]
MP Inertia ½MP(St) 0.877 [0.80-0.94] 0.97 [0.93-0.995]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼(St) 1.479 [1.06-1.92] 1.335 [0.84-1.82]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx(St) 0.35 [-0.09-0.85] 0.54 [0.05-1.03]
FP Inertia ½FP(St) 0.84 [0.74-0.93] 0.89 [0.79-0.97]
Budget De¯cit Target ¿0(St) -0.74 [-1.52-0.05] -0.61 [-1.48-0.33]
FP Debt feedback ¿B(St) -0.0016 [-0.04-0.04] -0.004 [-0.044-0.038]
FP Output Gap feedback ¿x(St) -0.42 [-0.7/-0.17] -0.52 [-0.89/-0.17]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r(St) 0.62 [0.54-0.63] 0.56 [0.47-0.66]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u(St) 0.87 [0.77-1.01] 0.82 [0.69-0.99]
Std. MP Shock ¾"(St) 1.07 [0.93-1.24] 0.88 [0.75-1.05]
Std. FP Shock ¾´(St) 0.58 [0.5-0.67] 0.70 [0.59-0.83]
Autoregr. coe®. rN
t ½r 0.81 [0.72-0.91] 0.81 [0.72-0.91]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u 0.47 [0.33-0.71] 0.47 [0.33-0.71]
Constant Gain g 0.058 [0.055-0.061] 0.058 [0.055-0.061]
Table 2 - Posterior Estimates: Pre-Election vs. Post-Election Regime (St = 1 if the economy is in
the seven quarters before an election date, St = 0 otherwise). The table displays the posterior mean
estimates across regimes and the 95% posterior probability intervals.
22President's Party Posterior Distribution
St = 0 St = 1
Description Parameter Mean 95% PPI Mean 95% PPI
Inverse IES ¾¡1 7.65 [5.42-10.64] 7.65 [5.42-10.64]
Discount Factor ¯ 0.99 - 0.99 -
Slope PC ·(St) 0.062 [0.01-0.13] 0.054 [0.008-0.13]
In°ation Target ¼¤(St) 2.98 [1.04-4.87] 3.01 [1.01-4.93]
MP Inertia ½MP(St) 0.906 [0.85-0.96] 0.837 [0.69-0.95]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼(St) 1.11 [0.65-1.60] 1.37 [0.96-1.84]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx(St) 0.59 [0.19-1.02] 0.19 [-0.19-0.73]
FP Inertia ½FP(St) 0.83 [0.72-0.93] 0.97 [0.93-0.995]
Budget De¯cit Target ¿0(St) -0.35 [-1.27-0.56] -0.72 [-1.72-0.26]
FP Debt feedback ¿B(St) 0.014 [-0.02-0.05] 0.03 [-0.01-0.07]
FP Output Gap feedback ¿x(St) -0.357 [-0.68/-0.07] -0.50 [-0.92/-0.05]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r(St) 0.65 [0.57-0.74] 0.89 [0.73-1.07]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u(St) 0.83 [0.72-0.95] 0.98 [0.82-1.19]
Std. MP Shock ¾"(St) 0.96 [0.84-1.11] 1.02 [0.85-1.23]
Std. FP Shock ¾´(St) 0.73 [0.64-0.84] 0.40 [0.34-0.49]
Autoregr. coe®. rN
t ½r 0.865 [0.79-0.94] 0.865 [0.79-0.94]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u 0.22 [0.11-0.35] 0.22 [0.11-0.35]
Constant Gain g 0.0508 [0.048-0.053] 0.0508 [0.048-0.053]
Table 3 - Posterior Estimates: Partisan Cycles, Republican vs. Democratic President (St = 1 if
the President is a Democrat, St = 0 if a Republican). The table displays the posterior mean estimates
across regimes and the 95% posterior probability intervals.
23Fed Chairman's Party Posterior Distribution
St = 0 St = 1
Description Parameter Mean 95% PPI Mean 95% PPI
Inverse IES ¾¡1 5.64 [3.75-8.25] 5.64 [3.75-8.25]
Discount Factor ¯ 0.99 - 0.99 -
Slope PC ·(St) 0.062 [0.01-0.15] 0.069 [0.01-0.17]
In°ation Target ¼¤(St) 2.98 [0.78-4.92] 2.77 [0.85-4.58]
MP Inertia ½MP(St) 0.904 [0.78-0.99] 0.834 [0.70-0.94]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼(St) 0.91 [0.32-1.68] 1.47 [1.01-1.92]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx(St) 0.71 [0.24-1.13] 0.12 [-0.34-1.65]
FP Inertia ½FP 0.90 [0.83-0.96] 0.90 [0.83-0.96]
Budget De¯cit Target ¿0 -0.82 [-1.78-0.15] -0.82 [-1.78-0.15]
FP Debt feedback ¿B 0.035 [-0.005-0.074] 0.035 [-0.005-0.074]
FP Output Gap feedback ¿x -0.47 [-0.79/-0.18] -0.47 [-0.79/-0.18]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r(St) 0.59 [0.51-0.67] 0.90 [0.74-1.10]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u(St) 0.83 [0.73-0.94] 1.00 [0.83-1.24]
Std. MP Shock ¾"(St) 0.75 [0.65-0.86] 1.3 [1.07-1.57]
Std. FP Shock ¾´ 0.64 [0.57-0.71] 0.64 [0.57-0.71]
Autoregr. coe®. rN
t ½r 0.85 [0.75-0.931] 0.85 [0.75-0.93]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u 0.42 [0.28-0.57] 0.42 [0.28-0.57]
Constant Gain g 0.0517 [0.048-0.054] 0.0517 [0.048-0.054]
Table 4 - Posterior Estimates: Partisan A±liation Federal Reserve's Chairman (St = 1 if the
Chairman is Democrat, St = 0 if the Chairman is Republican). The table displays the posterior mean
estimates across regimes and the 95% posterior probability intervals.
24Same Party/Pre-elect. Posterior Distribution
St = 0 St = 1
Description Parameter Mean 95% PPI Mean 95% PPI
Inverse IES ¾¡1 7.517 [5.37-10.29] 7.517 [5.37-10.29]
Discount Factor ¯ 0.99 - 0.99 -
Slope PC ·(St) 0.074 [0.016-0.16] 0.042 [0.005-0.116]
In°ation Target ¼¤(St) 2.49 [0.57-4.45] 3.20 [1.13-5.20]
MP Inertia ½MP(St) 0.89 [0.82-0.94] 0.95 [0.87-0.99]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼(St) 1.47 [1.06-1.93] 1.29 [0.68-1.83]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx(St) 0.33 [-0.08-0.79] 0.56 [0.09-1.06]
FP Inertia ½FP 0.88 [0.81-0.98] 0.88 [0.81-0.98]
Budget De¯cit Target ¿0 -0.65 [-1.64-0.33] -0.65 [-1.64-0.33]
FP Debt feedback ¿B 0.017 [-0.02-0.06] 0.017 [-0.02-0.06]
FP Output Gap feedback ¿x -0.46 [-0.76/-0.2] -0.46 [-0.76/-0.2]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r(St) 0.62 [0.54-0.71] 0.57 [0.47-0.79]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u(St) 0.87 [0.76-0.99] 0.89 [0.73-1.11]
Std. MP Shock ¾"(St) 0.99 [0.87-1.13] 1.03 [0.85-1.26]
Std. FP Shock ¾´ 0.63 [0.57-0.71] 0.63 [0.57-0.71]
Autoregr. coe®. rN
t ½r 0.84 [0.76-0.92] 0.84 [0.76-0.92]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u 0.4 [0.25-0.55] 0.4 [0.25-0.55]
Constant Gain g 0.0579 [0.055-0.061] 0.0579 [0.055-0.061]
Table 5 - Posterior Estimates: Regime is St = 1 if the President and the Fed's Chairman share
Party a±liation in pre-election quarters, St = 0 if they are from di®erent Parties or in a non-election
quarter. The table displays the posterior mean estimates across regimes and the 95% posterior prob-
ability intervals.
25Pre/Post Elect. Rep/Dem Pres. Rep/Dem Fed's Chairman Same Party+Pre-Elect.
Log MargL -785.67 -818.64 -794.22 -790.83
Table 6 - Model Comparison: Models' Marginal Likelihoods computed using Geweke's Harmonic
Mean Approximation.
26Pre vs. Post-ELECTION Posterior Distribution
St = 0 St = 1
Description Parameter Mean 95% PPI Mean 95% PPI
Inverse IES ¾¡1 6.22 [4.12-9.19] 6.22 [4.12-9.19]
Discount Factor ¯ 0.99 - 0.99 -
Slope PC ·(St) 0.127 [0.02-0.31] 0.096 [0.014-0.24]
In°ation Target ¼¤(St) 2.44 [0.5-4.31] 2.57 [0.65-4.47]
MP Inertia ½MP(St) 0.88 [0.79-0.95] 0.92 [0.83-0.99]
MP In°ation feedback Â¼(St) 1.35 [0.88-1.81] 1.31 [0.88-1.81]
MP Output Gap feedback Âx(St) 0.44 [0.02-0.91] 0.84 [0.27-1.34]
FP Inertia ½FP(St) 0.77 [0.61-0.92] 0.88 [0.73-0.98]
Budget De¯cit Target ¿0(St) -0.88 [-1.71/-0.17] -1.18 [-2.15/-0.23]
FP Debt feedback ¿B(St) -0.01 [-0.08-0.06] 0.015 [-0.07-0.1]
FP Output Gap feedback ¿x(St) -0.816 [-1.25/-0.3] -0.822 [-1.29/-0.24]
Std. Demand Shock ¾r(St) 0.47 [0.37-0.58] 0.43 [0.33-0.54]
Std. Supply Shock ¾u(St) 0.67 [0.55-0.81] 0.93 [0.73-1.19]
Std. MP Shock ¾"(St) 0.48 [0.39-0.58] 0.44 [0.34-0.56]
Std. FP Shock ¾´(St) 0.53 [0.43-0.66] 0.45 [0.35-0.58]
Autoregr. coe®. rN
t ½r 0.8 [0.66-0.92] 0.8 [0.66-0.92]
Autoregr. coe®. ut ½u 0.77 [0.64-0.9] 0.77 [0.64-0.9]
Constant Gain g 0.061 [0.055-0.067] 0.061 [0.055-0.067]
Table 7 - Posterior Estimates: Post-1985 Sample, Pre-Election vs. Post-Election Regime.
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Figure 3: Posterior Distributions: Regime given by Presidential Party.












































































Figure 4: Posterior Distributions: Regime given by Fed Chairman's Party.















































































Figure 5: Posterior Distributions: Pre-Election quarters when President and Fed Chairman
share Party A±liation.







TV Agents‘ Beliefs: Estimated Sensitivity of Output Gap to changes in the Interest Rate







TV Agents‘ Beliefs: Estimated Autoregressive Coefficient in Inflation
Figure 6: Selected Beliefs.
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Figure 7: Selected Beliefs.






Differences in Monetary Policy due to Pre−Election Periods











Differences in Fiscal Policy due to Pre−Election Periods




Figure 8: Di®erences in Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Pre-Election Periods. The table































































































































Figure 9: Posterior Distributions: Post-1985 Sample, Pre-Election vs. Post-Election Regime.
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